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The noTion of Being as acT in neoplaTonism and iTs 
Transmission in The TranslaTio sTudiorum
rita salis
1. introduction
The problem of the origin of the concept of actus essendi constitutes one 
of the central themes in the history of ancient philosophy, and is one of 
the most important in the process known as translatio studiorum. The 
idea that Thomas aquinas was the first to consider this concept has been 
contrasted with the idea that actus essendi was already present in neopla-
tonism. in fact, the concept of “being” in Thomas aquinas’s philosophy 
has been interpreted in many different ways over the years, especially in 
relation to aristotle’s concept of being. in his book on being according 
to Thomas, giovanni Ventimiglia recognizes three generations1 within 
the historiography of Thomistic ontology. The first generation, begun by 
reginald garrigou-lagrange, lasted until the end of the 1930s and main-
tained that the being of Thomas equated with that of aristotle.2 during 
the second generation, lasting from the beginning of the 1930s to the end 
of the 50s and whose main exponent was e. gilson, the being of Thomas 
was seen as the actus essendi. These scholars therefore interpreted it as a 
completely new and original concept compared to both aristotle’s being 
and the neoplatonic school of thought, by which Thomas may have been 
influenced.3 lastly, the third generation—in which Thomas’s concept of 
1 see giovanni Ventimiglia, differenza e contraddizione: il problema dell’essere in Tom­
maso d’aquino: esse, diversum, contradictio (milano: Vita e pensiero, 1997), 5. The author 
also specifies here that in using the term “generations” he does not intend to indicate 
a rigid chronological-generational division, but different ways of interpreting Thomistic 
ontology that have developed through the years. 
2 ibid., 7–8 and notes, refers to reginald garrigou-lagrange, les sens commun, la 
philosophie de l’être et les formules dogmatiques (paris: Beauchesne, 1909), 138ff., and 
includes in the first generation francesco olgiati, l’anima di s. Tommaso: saggio filosofico 
intorno alla concezione tomista (milano: Vita e pensiero, 1923), 17; antonin d. sertillanges, 
st. Thomas d’aquin (paris: alcan, 1910), 1: 14–20; gallus m. manser, das Wesen des Thomis­
mus (freiburg i.d.s.: st. paulus-druckerei, 1932), passim; aimé forest, la structure métaphy­
sique du concret selon saint Thomas d’aquin (paris: Vrin, 1931), 36. 
3 The texts referred to by Ventimiglia, differenza e contraddizione, 10ff. and notes, are: 
Étienne gilson, God and Philosophy (new haven: Yale University press, 1941), 144ff., in 
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being is considered to be unoriginal, having been elaborated within the 
world of neoplatonism—originated at the beginning of the 1970s and per-
sists to this day. Werner Beierwaltes and Klaus Kremer, among others, 
have led this most recent generation.4
however, together with Ventimiglia,5 it is necessary to recognize the 
importance that the publication of two other works had on the assertion 
made by the “third generation.” These works are p. hadot’s two volumes 
on Porphyre et Victorinus, published in 1968,6 and Beierwaltes’s book 
entitled Platonismus und idealismus, published in 1972.7 in the latter’s 
book, the author demonstrates that the identification of god with being 
had been made by plutarch and porphyry as well as by philo of alexan-
dria, gregory of nazianzus, gregory of nyssa, Victorinus and augustine. 
in hadot’s volume, together with the observation that this identification 
had been expressed in neoplatonism, the definition of being as act is also 
traced back to the same period.
more specifically, this paper will discuss the section of hadot’s study 
which appears in the appendix of the second volume, containing the text 
and the translation of the fragments of the anonymous commentary on 
which the scholar, diverging from the initial viewpoint which highlighted Thomas’s aris-
totelianism as opposed to his platonism (see Étienne gilson, “pourquoi saint Thomas a 
critiqué saint augustin,” archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen Âge 1 (1926–27), 
125), no longer identifies Thomas’s being with aristotle’s, but with the old Testament god 
in Exodus 3:14, a verse read as “i am the being;” Étienne gilson, le Thomisme. introduction 
à la philosophie de saint Thomas d’aquin (paris: Vrin, 1942), in which even the concept of 
the act of being is stated once again. Ventimiglia also reveals the profound influence that 
J. maritain exerted on gilson’s theory.
4 Ventimiglia sees the forerunner of the new current as cornelia J. de Vogel, “ ‘ego 
sum qui sum’ et sa signification pour une philosophie chrétienne,” revue des sciences 
religieuse 34–35 (1960–61), 348, in which the following points are put forth: (1) the greeks 
were the first to identify god with being, and this concept was unknown to hebrews; 
(2) the greeks (i.e. plato and the platonists, plutarch, the second century platonists of asia 
minor, plotinus and the neoplatonists) acknowledge that the perfect, eternal, intelligible 
and transcendent Being is divine; (3) the identification of god as being was unknown to 
moses” audience; (4) the 70, representatives of the rather syncretist society of third cen-
tury egypt, who translated the Bible from hebrew, were most likely influenced by greek 
thought when they translated the verse from exodus with: egô eimi ho ôn. These assertions 
found their highest recognition in, for example, Werner Beierwaltes, “der Kommentar zum 
“liber de causis” als neuplatonisches element in der philosophie des Thomas von aquin,” 
Philosophische rundschau 2 (1963), 215; Klaus Kremer, die neuplatonische seinsphilosophie 
und ihre Wirkung auf Thomas von aquin (leiden: Brill, 1966), 377–78. see Ventimiglia, dif­
ferenza e contraddizione, 22ff. and notes, which may also be consulted for a detailed recon-
struction of the debate which followed on Thomas’s being.
5 see Ventimiglia, differenza e contraddizione, 27ff. and notes.
6 pierre hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (paris: Études augustiniennes, 1968).
7 Werner Beierwaltes, Platonismus und idealismus (frankfurt a.m.: Klostermann, 1972).
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plato’s Parmenides. The introductory essay added to the italian transla-
tion of this section will also be considered8 it is thanks to hadot and the 
exponents of Ventimiglia’s “third generation” that the communis opinio, 
according to which the concept of actus essendi can first be found in the 
philosophy of Thomas, was disproved. hadot in particular demonstrated 
that the notion of “act of being” originated from both the anonymous 
commentary to the Parmenides by plato, which he attributes to porphyry, 
and the Enneads by plotinus. This paper will first examine the fragments 
of the commentary in order to show that in it may be found both the 
identification of god with being and the concept of being as actus essendi. 
an analysis of Enneads 6.8 and 7 will follow. This is one of the passages 
in the work by plotinus which most deserves to be considered in order 
to verify the effective anticipation of neoplatonism in a doctrine that has 
traditionally been deemed to be of Thomistic origin. finally, of particular 
interest is the comparison between being as interpreted by neoplatonism, 
especially by plotinus, and act as conceived by aristotle, unanimously rec-
ognized as its discoverer.
2. The anonymous Commentary to Plato’s parmenides
The commentary on plato’s Parmenides, which hadot ascribes to por-
phyry, was written on a few palimpsest folios of an evangeliary of Bobbio, 
preserved in the national library in Turin, but destroyed by fire in 1904. 
in 1873, Bernardino peyron was the author of the first edition,9 while the 
first critical edition was published in 1892 by Wilhelm Kroll.10
The first fragment probably refers to the section of the Parmenides11 in 
which plato places the hypotheses related to the one. The author attri-
butes the notion of “one” to god,12 and states that the one eliminates 
 8 porfirio, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone, a cura di pierre hadot (milano: Vita 
e pensiero, 1993).
 9 “notizia di un antico evangelario bobbiese che in alcuni fogli palimpsesti contiene 
frammenti d’un greco trattato di filosofia,” rivista di Filologia e d’istruzione classica 1 (1873), 
53–71. 
10 Wilhelm Kroll, “ein neuplatonischer parmenidescommentar in einem Turiner 
palimpsest,” rheinisches museum 47 (1892), 599–627.
11  see plato Parmenides 136a–137c; pierre hadot, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Pla­
tone, a cura di pierre hadot, 20.
12 in translating ô theos by “god” with a capital “g” and without the article, instead of 
“the god,” i follow the thesis supported by enrico Berti in relation to the god of aristotle 
as opposed to that of neoplatonism. Berti, against the widespread habit among scholars 
to translate ô theos with “god,” believes that this way of rendering the greek expression 
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any multiplicity and composition from god, making him appear simple 
and as the origin of other things. god is ascribed infinite power (apeiron 
dunamin) and is said, due to the fact that he is neither one nor many, to 
be beyond not only the notion of multitude, but also that of one. finally, 
the commentator claims that god is ineffable, so it will be possible “to stay 
in non-apprehensive apprehension and in a conception which conceives 
nothing.” This is the only way “to rest at the ineffable implicit notion of 
him.”13
The second fragment seems to refer to the first hypothesis of the Par­
menides—if one is—and also appears to allude to the part of the dialogue 
in which it is said that the one is neither one nor many, neither simi-
lar nor dissimilar.14 The question is raised whether or not god therefore 
would be dissimilar to the mind, that is to say from the second hypostasis 
according to the neoplatonists. The answer given is that, as in the case 
of the sunset, in which the sun is neither illuminated nor darkened, but 
these are conditions (pathêma) of those on earth; or, as people sailing 
along the land think that it is the land which is moving when they them-
selves are moving, so god is neither similar nor dissimilar, because he 
is without relationship to the things subsequent to him. rather, all the 
things which are, since they are unlike him, seek to attach themselves 
to him, thinking that their relationships are reciprocal also to him. god 
has being as something inseparable from himself and not as an addition, 
because that would mean that god has being imperfectly, or rather as 
an addition to his own perfection. it is not god who is nothing for those 
who want to know him, but we and all things which are, are nothing in 
relation to him. it is for this reason that we cannot know him, because 
human mind grasps the like through the like. The commentator answers 
the question whether or not god knows by saying that he has knowledge, 
but not the kind gained following ignorance; he knows by transcending 
(huperechôn) all knowledge. god’s knowledge cannot be compared to that 
brings the aristotelian god closer to the god of monotheistic religions. The result is then 
a confusion of the kind of causality of aristotle’s unmoved mover with a creationist or 
neoplatonic concept of divinity (see enrico Berti, “ancora sulla causalità del motore 
immobile,” methexis 20 (2007), 26–28). my choice of translating ô theos with “god” in a 
neoplatonic context does not indicate tacit consent with the common translation of the 
greek expression, rather a choice dictated by the necessity to distinguish it from the god 
of aristotle. 
13 porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 1.1–2 (see gerald Bechtle, The anony­
mous Commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides” (Bern·stuttgart·Wien: haupt, 1999), 39–43.
14 see plato Parmenides 139B–140B; hadot, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone, 20.
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of other knowing things, because his knowledge coincides with itself, the 
same way an unilluminated light is not darkened, but is merely light. god 
is thus removed from the others, and is filled with his own unity, while 
the things that come into being are nothing in relation to him.15
The third fragment is made up of the passage from the Parmenides 
which concerns the affirmation related to the first hypothesis for which 
the one cannot be in time,16 and a brief comment.17
The fourth fragment refers to the section of the first hypothesis of 
the Parmenides in which the one is considered to be unspeakable and 
unknowable.18 The exegete proposes a negative theology rather than a 
positive theology, because—he states—the only possible knowledge of 
the one is similar to the knowledge possessed by those blind from birth, 
who can learn the difference between colors only through the description 
of logical symbols. They would, in fact, understand the meaning of the 
colors, but they would not know exactly what they are, since they cannot 
perceive them. in the same way, we lack a direct perception of god, so we 
must admit that negative theology is better than positive theology.19
The fifth fragment concerns the beginning of the second hypothesis 
and its subject is whether or not the one-which-is can be and not have a 
participation in ousia.20 The commentator, based on the plotinian inter-
pretation of the Parmenides which finds a hypostasis for every hypothesis,21 
establishes a correspondence between the second hypothesis of the pla-
tonic dialogue (if one is) and plotinus’s second hypostasis: that-which-is 
(the second one). since the second one is ousia and therefore should not 
participate in it, the problem arises as to how the second one can par-
ticipate in ousia.22 The exegete proposes two solutions based on the two 
different meanings of “participation,” that is the platonic meaning of “take 
part in,” which implies the relationship between two forms, and the typi-
cally neoplatonic meaning of “to receive a transcendent form.” The com-
mentator’s first explanation attempts to avoid the absurd consequence 
which derives from the affirmation that the one participates in ousia, 
15 see porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 2.3–6.
16 see plato Parmenides 141a–d. 
17 see porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 3.7–8.
18 see plato Parmenides 141d–142a.
19 see porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 4.9–10; hadot, Commentario al 
“Parmenide” di Platone, 21.
20 see plato Parmenides 142B.
21 see plotinus Enneads 6.6.1.1ff.
22 see hadot, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone, 44.
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namely that the ousia must preexist the one. The same way in which, if 
in the definition of “man” one takes “animal” and says that it participated 
in “reasonable,” the conclusion would be that man is “reasonable animal” 
as a whole, since “reasonable” has changed with “animal” and, vice versa, 
the one has changed with substance and substance has changed with the 
one, imitating the simplicity of the one that is only one, which converts 
into the Being. consequently, that-which-is, is the all that is composed of 
unity and essence.23
The necessity of the second explanation, which refers to intelligible sub-
stances, derives from the fact that the first does not explain the essence 
that is added to the one.24 The commentator says that, since the second 
one, that is the one-being, was due to the first, that is the pure one, 
and the second one is that-which-is, we must hypothesize that the first 
one is, in connection with the second, the pure Being, and in virtue of its 
participation the second one is also that-which-is.25 Therefore the second 
one that participates in the ousia is not simply matter that assumes form, 
but receives a transcendent ousia.26 But how can the second one receive 
an ousia, given that there is no ousia before it, since the first one is not 
being, nor substance, nor action?27 The answer is found in the following 
lines:
But consider whether plato does not seem to be talking in riddles, since the 
one that is beyond substance and beyond that-which-is, is on the one hand 
not that-which-is nor substance nor act (oude energheia), but on the other 
hand rather acts (energhei de mallon); the acting also is itself pure (auto to 
energhein katharon), so that the being itself, which is before that-which-is, 
is also [pure]. participating in this, the other one has from it an extracted 
being, which means to participate in that-which-is.28
This passage states that the one that is beyond substance and beyond 
that-which-is,29 that is the first one, is therefore not substance, nor being, 
and not even act, but he himself acts, since his ousia (i.e. his being) con-
sists in the pure act. The assertion that the first one is not act and the 
23 ibid., 45.
24 ibid.
25 see porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 5.11–12.
26 see hadot, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone, 45.
27 see porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria, 5.12.23; hadot, Commentario al 
“Parmenide” di Platone, 45. 
28 porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 5.12.22–29 (see Bechtle, The anony­
mous Commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides,” 61–62).
29 see plato republic 509B.
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statement that he acts both clearly indicate that his activity is not some-
thing added to his ousia, but that his essence coincides with actuality. The 
first one is not substance, but he has the substance as act, the “pure act 
of being.”30 he will therefore be ousia in his own way, that is his being 
is pure act. it is thus impossible not to agree with hadot when he says 
that being constitutes the highest and purest act,31 and therefore that the 
concept of actus essendi is already present in the anonymous commentary 
to the Parmenides.
The sixth and last fragment concerns the second hypothesis of the 
Parmenides, which reads as follows:
Then what about this? if by reflection we take unity itself, which we say has 
a share of being, just alone by itself, without that of which we say it has a 
share, will it appear to be only one, or will that very thing appear many as 
well? one, i should think.32
in this passage, it is plato’s intention to separate, through a mental opera-
tion, and take the one-which-is alone, and consider it by itself. in this 
way, the one-which-is is considered separately from the one, in which the 
former participates, since it is considered independently from the many 
that were implied by his relationship with the Being.33 hadot explains 
that for a neoplatonic commentator a similar argument raises the prob-
lem of how to consider the one taken separately from the one-which-is. 
The scholar believes that, in order to solve the problem, one must start at 
the end of the fragment, where the one is described as to auto touto, this 
itself. The author of the commentary says that this itself is different from 
“himself.” on the one hand, he is one and simple, on the other, since it is 
different from himself, it is no longer simple. consequently, it is one and 
simple in its first form, that is according to the form of this itself consid-
ered alone. nevertheless, when he becomes existence, life and thought, he 
is no longer one nor simple. so the answer plato gives to this problem is 
that, if the one is considered by itself, separately from the Being, he is one 
and simple. on the other hand, if he participates in the Being, he is many.34 
30 see hadot, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone, 45.
31 ibid., 47f., where hadot supposes that the origin of this doctrine can be found in the 
plotinian treatise on the freedom and will of the one (see plotinus Enneads 6.8.4.28). 
32 plato Parmenides 143a (see reginald e. allen, Plato’s parmenides, Translation and 
analysis (oxford: Blackwell, 1983), 24.
33 see maurizio migliori, dialettica e Verità: Commentario filosofico al “Parmenide” di 
Platone (milano: Vita e pensiero, 1990), 230–31.
34 see hadot, Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone, 22–23.
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however, since according to the commentator the one-which-is coincides 
with the mind, the distinction made by plato corresponds to two states 
of the mind. considered in itself, the mind is absolutely simple:35 “it is 
neither at rest nor in motion, neither the same nor different, neither in 
itself nor in another.”36 in this way, it is identified with the one in its 
first form. considered in its second state, the mind “is at rest and is in 
motion at the same time, is in itself and in another, is a whole and has 
parts, and is the same and is different,”37 so it is act on the level of life, 
thought and existence.38 Thus life, existence and thought are acts that 
characterize the state in which the mind emerges from its purity in order 
to become concrete.
3. The actus essendi in Plotinus
one of the passages that most deserves examination with regard to the 
concept of actus essendi is the conclusion of Enneads 6.8.7, in which 
plotinus states:
Where—since we must use such words—the essential act (energheia) is 
identical with the being (hupostasis)—and this identity must obtain in the 
good since it holds even in the intellectual-principle—there the act is no 
more determined by the being (kata to einai) than the being by the act (kata 
tên energheian). Thus “acting according to its nature” does not apply; the 
act, the life, so to speak, cannot be held to issue from the being; the being 
accompanies the act in an eternal association: from the two (being and act) 
it forms itself into the good, self-springing and unspringing.39
at the beginning of this passage it is asserted that, regarding the one, 
existence identifies itself with act, which is true also of the intellectual-
principle. plotinus, in fact, had just established that both being and act 
coincide in intellectual-principle. The neoplatonic philosopher arrived at 
this conclusion by raising the questions as to whether or not intellectual-
principle possesses independence and freedom—in an act which cannot 
35 see porphyrius in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria 6.14. 30–31.
36 ibid., 6.14.31–34 (see Bechtle, The anonymous Commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides,” 
65).
37 ibid., 6.14.25–29 (see Bechtle, The anonymous Commentary on Plato’s “Parmenides,” 
65).
38 ibid., 6.13–14.
39 plotinus Enneads 6.8.7.46–54 (see plotinus, The Enneads, trans. stephen macKenna, 
abridged with an introduction and notes by John dillon (london: penguin books, 1991), 
520).
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remain unreacted—and whether or not free will can be attributed to 
higher beings in general. plotinus’s reasoning is as follows: since act, he 
argues, will be performed without reason, but is always determined by an 
external need,40 if higher beings obey their own nature, how can there 
be freedom? Yet if, on the other hand, they do not obey an extern, how 
can they be called slaves? how could that which pursues the good be 
subject to constraint, given that the movement occurs spontaneously only 
if it knows to direct itself towards the good qua good? plotinus, in fact, 
intends “involuntary” as a deviation from the good, since that which devi-
ates from the attainment of the good and approaches something more 
powerful than itself, becomes a slave of that which is more powerful. 
Being a slave of one’s own nature implies a duality—master and mas-
tered. now, plotinus wonders, how is it possible that a simplex activity, 
which cannot have any difference of potentiality and act, is not free? it is 
not even possible to think “action according to the nature,” in the sense 
of any distinction between the being and its efficiency. Where act is per-
formed neither because of anything else, nor depends on anything else, 
then surely there is freedom. intellectual-principle cannot depend on any-
thing else, nor act according to anything else, because it is the principle. 
if intellectual-principle, plotinus concludes, has a different principle, it is 
not outside of, but within the good, and this makes it all the more free, 
given that everyone searches for freedom for the sake of the good.41
The conclusion of the seventh section of Enneads 6.8 again concerns 
the freedom of intellectual-principle, and starts by referring to that which 
was established in Enneads 6.8.5, that is that the soul also is free, not for 
itself, but because it strives towards the good through intellectual-princi-
ple. instead, intellectual-principle, according to plotinus, is free in itself, 
because its operation (ergon) is not applied to anything else, but coincides 
with intellectual-principle itself: “at rest in its good,” states plotinus, “it 
is without need, complete, and may be said to live to its will”.42 now, 
what plotinus said with regard to intellectual-principle—that in it act and 
existence coincide—is true also for the one, that is for the good. in sec-
tion seven, plotinus claims that it is absurd to think that the one-good is 
not free because it generates according to its nature, since that would be 
like claiming that it is free only if and when it generates or acts against 
40 see aristotle nicomachean Ethics 3.1.1110a2.
41  see plotinus Enneads 6.8.4.
42  ibid., 6.8.6.35–36 (see plotinus The Enneads, 518).
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nature. The uniqueness of a being does not take away its freedom—a 
unique being would not be free if this uniqueness derived from something 
outside of it, or rather from an obstacle, while it is free if its uniqueness 
is identified with its same essence. Therefore, it is free for the fact that it 
is good and has no need to move towards something else. Whoever tries 
to reach the good as something else would be, in virtue of that thing, 
deprived of freedom.43 This established, plotinus’s argument continues 
without specifying any subject, but also without there being any reason 
to think that the author is not referring to the one-good. plotinus writes 
that, since, just as occurs with intellectual-principle, its existence is the 
same as its action (autou), if we say that “it acts in accordance with its 
being” this is no better than saying “it is in accordance with its act.” The 
meaning of plotinus’s argument is that, since existence and act are identi-
fied with the one, saying that the one acts in consonance with its being is 
the same as saying that it is in accordance with its acting. Therefore, act 
is the being of the one.
The identity in the one of act and being is repeated in the final part 
of the passage. plotinus asserts that the one does not possess an activity 
in accordance with its nature. its activity, that is its life, was in fact born 
together with (sungenomenê) its essence from eternity. The one generates 
itself starting from its being and its own activity, and it belongs only to 
itself. in the one, therefore, act is given by being, and the generating act 
that the one carries out for itself is made by starting from being and act, 
that is from its own existence and its own activity. Just as, according to 
fragment five of the anonymous commentary to the Parmenides, activity 
does not add itself to and does not issue from the one, but coincides with 
its same being. Both passages thus constitute well-founded proof of the 
fact that the concept of actus essendi, which according to the traditional 
interpretation was first introduced by Thomas of aquinas, was actually 
already present in neoplatonic thought, in, for example, plotinus and the 
commentator of the Parmenides.
4. Plotinus and aristotle
The fact that plotinus posits the act as being of the one raises the ques-
tion as to what kind of relationship exists between this idea of act and that 
43 see plotinus Enneads 6. 8.7.36–46.
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of aristotle, who was the first to introduce the concept. scholars widely 
attribute this discovery to the stagirite, even hans J. Krämer, who stressed 
aristotle’s dependence on plato. Krämer claimed that before aristotle 
there existed only a Vorgeschichte of the doctrine of potency and actual-
ity, in which potency was identified as a mathematical concept emerg-
ing from plato’s unwritten doctrines, and a concept of teleion, developed 
by speusippus, who, differently from aristotle, gave priority to the seed 
and not the plant, thus assigning priority to potency.44 aristotle’s concept 
of “act” is expressed in the terms energheia and entelecheia, which recur 
throughout most of the metaphysics. The two terms, however, were not 
always used with the same meaning, and Berti has shown that this does 
not necessarily indicate a chronological evolution, but rather a logical-
conceptual transition in which Berti distinguishes three main lines, iden-
tifiable within the concepts of act as motion, as being and as activity.45
The concept of act as motion appears in Book 9 of the metaphysics with 
the concept of potency, considered in relation to motion—that is with the 
concept of potency as source of change in another thing or in the thing 
itself qua other. aristotle introduces the concept of act in order to answer 
the megarians who believed in the existence of potency only when there 
is actuality. aristotle asserts that it was decided to use the term energheia 
with a particular meaning, which therefore derives from a convention, 
that is with the meaning of entelecheia, and this meaning can also be 
attributed to other things different from motions. The stagirite nonethe-
less makes this declaration in order to point out that this meaning derives 
from the more common one of motion. Thus, two distinct meanings of 
the term energheia emerge: one is more common, more primitive and 
primary, and therefore means motion, whereas the other meaning is later 
and derives from a linguistic convention according to which energheia 
equals entelecheia and means “being” or “being in action.”46 Berti observes 
that the interest in the original meaning of energheia lies in its express-
ing a strong way of being, a being seen as acting and being acted upon, 
that is a dynamic concept of being, and that this definition of energheia 
44 see enrico Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di aristotele,” in enrico Berti, 
aristotele. dalla dialettica alla filosofia prima (milano: Bompiani, 2004), 552; hans J. 
Krämer, “das Verhältnis von plato und aristoteles in neuer sicht,” Zeitschrift für philoso­
phische Forschung 26 (1972), 342–43.
45 see Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di aristotele,” 553–54.
46 ibid., 555–56. 
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establishes the transition to the later definition, that is to say that of 
“being,” corresponding to the technical concept of entelecheia.47
aristotle deals with energheia as entelecheia in the sixth chapter of 
Book 9 of the metaphysics. here it is said that “actuality (energheia) means 
the existence of the thing (to huparchein to pragma), not in the sense that 
we mean by potency.”48 Berti underlines the importance of the passage 
for the fact that, although it does not contain a definition, since it refers 
to the notion of potency, which in aristotle’s thinking presupposes that 
of act,49 it does allude to a way of existing that is not only a determina-
tion, but rather is a real being. according to Berti, the missing definition 
of the act confirms the fact that the potency-act pair is seen as a distinc-
tion between two basic definitions of being, that is as coextensive with 
the whole being, since being cannot fit into any definition, which would 
constitute a limitation.50
aristotle’s act therefore expresses an existence and, nonetheless, like 
Berti, it should be recognized that this is not enough to identify this con-
cept with Thomas’s concept of actus essendi. act also has many meanings, 
since “every act is always a determinate act, that is it means a determinate 
existence.”51 indeed, act and potency are the meanings of being that are 
predicated of all the categories,52 which also constitute other meanings of 
being, and therefore of existence.53 The doctrine of the many meanings of 
being forced aristotle to reject the admission of an entity which has being 
as its essence—what will be called in scholasticism Esse ipsum subsistens. 
as Berti rightly pointed out, aristotle did not ignore the concept of actus 
essendi, but conscientiously rejected it, since it was irreconcilable with his 
doctrine of the many meanings of being.54
47 ibid., 557.
48 aristotle metaphysics 9.6.1048a30–32.
49 ibid., 8.1049b12–14.
50 see Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di aristotele,” 559–61.
51  ibid., 564.
52 see aristotle metaphysics 5.7.1017b2; Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di 
aristotele,” 564.
53 ibid., 5.7, 1017a23–24; 8.2.1042b25–28; Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di 
aristotele,” 564.
54 see Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di aristotele,” 565. according to aris-
totle, this concept of act corresponds to substance or form, i.e., to the essence or first 
substance of everything (see aristotle metaphysics 7.7.1032b1–2). With regard to this, 
Berti observed that aristotle’s identification of act with substance has been incorrectly 
contrasted with the identification of act with existence acknowledged by avicenna and 
Thomas, who derived from the Bible the concept of god as actus essendi. While aristotle 
views the substance identified with act as a substance which actually exists, essence for 
avicenna and Thomas is a substance by potency, purely thought. according to Berti, 
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The final and most significant instance in the development of the aris-
totelian concept of act is found in the doctrine of the unmoved mover 
contained in the second part of Book 12 of the metaphysics. The existence 
of aristotle’s god as pure act and thinking in itself is demonstrated also 
on the basis of his doctrine of potency and act, seen as substance, that is 
as being. in chapter six, indeed, it is shown that the eternity of motion 
necessitates not only a mover that moves eternally without ever moving 
itself, but also a cause that is eternally in action since, if it were not so, the 
movement could cease at any time. The mover must therefore be abso-
lutely immovable, eternal, completely without potency and immaterial, 
since matter is potency. The actuality of the first cause, nonetheless, is not 
linked to motion, rather to its being, because the necessary condition for 
the eternity of motion is that its substance be act.
such an act, however, cannot be actus essendi, since aristotle does not 
allow an entity that has only the being as its essence. The act of aristo-
tle’s unmoved mover cannot be what he defines in the de anima as “first 
act,” a simple possession of knowledge. This meaning of act indeed comes 
before in the generation of the individual, but in relation to the substance, 
it comes after the “second act,” which even though in the generation 
follows the possession, is more important because it constitutes the real-
ization, that is the activity.55 The activity that belongs to god can only be 
of the most perfect kind, and such is thought. Thus, the unmoved mover 
is thought. But according to aristotle thought is not just being, but also 
life. The act of thought is in fact defined as life,56 and the life of god is 
ceaseless and eternal.57 Thought, therefore, is of course being, but it is the 
being of the most perfect entity, not just of being.58
if it is beyond doubt that it was aristotle who first considered act, it is 
just as sure that aristotle never conceived of an actus essendi, but only of 
an act of a certain activity like moving, living and thinking. This clearly 
distinguishes his concept of act from the one that can be found in neopla-
tonism, which, on the other hand, acknowledges act as an act of being.
this would be proved by the fact that the form with which aristotle identifies the basic 
meaning of substance, that is the first substance, is not a universal form, existing only in 
thought, but an individual form, existing in act (see Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafi-
sica di aristotele,” 562–63).
55 see aristotle on the soul 2.1. 412a22ff. This fact was pointed out in Berti, “il concetto 
di atto nella metafisica di aristotele,” 566–67.
56 see aristotle metaphysics 12.7.1072b26–27.
57 ibid., 107 2b29–30.
58 see Berti, “il concetto di atto nella metafisica di aristotele,” 568–69.
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